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Europe 
The following pages reproduce in full the text of the speech made by Walter 
Hallstein,  President  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity, before a joint meeting of Harvard University and the Massachusetts 
Institute  of  Technology  on  May  22,  1961.  Its  theme-summed  up  in  the 
sentence  'We are not in  business  at all:  we  are in politics'-is  the political 
It  nature and objectives of the European Community. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND 
POLITICAL UNITY IN EUROPE 
What I should like to discuss tonight is the political response that we  in  the West are making to  the 
challenges that face us today. That which concerns me most directly is the creation of what is known 
as the European Economic Community -of whose Commission I have the honour to be President. 
In name, as  you know, it is 'economic': but what I want to stress tonight is that it is also political. 
Note that I say 'it is political' -not just that it tends towards a  political goal.  That goal has  been 
described by  none  less  than Winston Churchill as 'a United States of Europe'. My  aim tonight is 
to show that the future has already begun. 
As  you know,  it was  in  1950  that Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  the  Benelux  countries  set  up  the 
European Coal and Steel Community. It was  in  1957 that they set up Euratom-the Atomic Energy 
Community- and the so-called Common Market-the European Economic Community.  These are 
economic organizations - but they are also  highly political. 
The obligations of rnernbership 
The  question  may  arise:  Why  does  the  European Economic Community have only six members? 
Well, it is not because we are some kind of. an: exclusive club. Our number was not decided by those 
who  joined, but rather by  those who did not join.  Our founding  Treaty holds  out two  possibilities 
for  European states - full  membership, or association.  Full membership  means full  acceptance of 
the Treaty and the institutions it establishes. It means  acceptance  of  the  political  significance  and 
dynamism of these institutions. A full member must agree to build common policy in a wide range 
of endeavour. Association, on the other hand, is only partial membership. An associate takes on only 
a part of the obligations of our Treaty and enjoys only a portion of the rights of full members. 
The basic economic idea underlying the Common Market is that the resources of modern technology  ·-, 
can only be used to the full if the economic area within which they are developed is large enough. In  _ 
the economic sphere, the modem world is  a world of continents, of markets and economies on the 
grand scale. Divided economies and divided markets  mean  small-scale  efforts,  which  in  turn  mean 
waste and relative poverty. In the United States, with its huge common market of some  180  million 
people,  some  seventy  million  men  and  women-the  working  population-in  1960  produced  the 
equivalent of more than 503  billion dollars. In the same year in  the Community  countries,  with  a 
combined population of nearly 170 million. a working population even larger than that of the United 
States produced the equivalent of only some 180 billion dollars -little more than one-third of what a 
smaller working population in America produced in the same time. You may say, quite rightly:  'But 
American  industry  is  more  capital-intensive'.  But why is this so? Because it can afford to produce 
for the vast American home market, and can thus afford the massive investments that a large market 
both requires and makes possible.  Only by  establishing in Europe a  home market of this  scale can 
we hope to  play our full part in producing and exploiting the world's wealth. 
Not just free trade 
The idea of a single large home market, therefore, lies  at the heart of the movement for  economic 
integration. But this in itself involves political issues. It  is not just a movement for free trade between 
separate economies.  It i!;l  a movement to fuse  markets - and  economies- into  one,  and  to  establish 
within that 'common market' the conditions and characteristics of any single national market. This 
means sweeping away the classical barriers to trade, tariffs and quotas. It means removing less obvious 
barriers-various  types  of  discrimination;  legislative barriers; glaring tax differences, and so on. It 
means  ensuring that private barriers do not divide the market-for example, market-sharing agree-
ments  and the  activities  of trusts.  It means  maintaining  the external  conditions  of  a  single  home  • 
market, by  making uniform for the whole area the conditions in which  imports  may  enter· it.  This 
entails  merging  the separate national customs tariffs vis-a-vis the rest of the world into one single, 
common  tariff,  and applying  a  single  common  policy  for  external trade.  All  these  are  matters  of 
political  importance. 
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A  single economic pollc~ 
And  a  common  market goes  even  further  than  this.  Within  a  home  market,  not  only goods,  but 
persons,  services,  and  capital,  can  circulate  freely.  The  same  must  apply  to  a  common  market 
composed of numerous states. A home market means  a  home  market for agriculture :  therefore  it 
cannot be left out of a common market-or not, at least,  without running into the risk of favouring 
one  partner unfairly against  another, and  thus  leaving  the  whole  edifice  not only  incomplete  but 
lop-sided. Nor, in the delicate matter of agriculture.  where  so  many  stubborn  traditions and such 
cieep  political passions are involved, can things be left to look after themselves. A common.market 
in  agriculture inescapably involves  a  common  agricultural  policy  to replace  the  often  conflicting 
policies of the national states. Much the same is true of  transport~ another field  where full and free 
competition is not yet a practicable goal.  Finally, and most .difficult of all, if we  seek to  establish a 
single home market and a single economy, we must progressively fuse into one our separate national 
policies and move towards one economic policy for the Community as a whole. 
This, in a nutshell, is the philosophy behind the Common· Market Treaty.  But let me  state  it more 
concisely still. The statement is  not mine. It comes from one of the last documents produced by the 
League of Nations, and issued by the United Nations in  1947.  Here it is:  'For a customs union to 
exist it is  necessary to allow free  movement of goods within the union. For a customs union to be a 
reality, it is  necessary to allow free  movement of persons.  For ·a  customs  union  to  be  stable  it is 
necessary  to  maintain free  exchangeability of currency and ·stable exchange rates within the union. 
This implies, inter alia,  free movement of capital within the union. When there is free movement of 
goods,  persons,  and  capital  in  an  area,  diverse  economic  policies  concerned  with  maintaining 
economic activity cannot be pursued'.  1 
Federal institutions 
Economically, therefore, those states that commit themselves to the Common Market commit them-
selves to a far-reaching process of integration into  a  single  unit.  Is this  not a far-reaching  political 
commitment? Let me continue the quotation that I cited just now. It goes on: 'To assure uniformity 
of policy  some  political mechanism is  required'.  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  do  not need ·to  remind 
you that our European Community has established an institutional mechanism whose. salient features 
are federal. They are founded upon the principal of democratic control, embodied in the European 
Parliament, which  is  really  the active beginnings of a  Parliament:  it  has  the  one  great pow~r of 
overthrowing the executive organ of the Community, i.e.  the  Commission, and  a  number of  much 
lesser  powers.  such  as  that  of  constantly  putting  questions,  being  legally  entitled  to  an  answer, 
and the right to be consulted on most occasions when the Community proposes to legislate. It is  my 
belief that these powers must be augmented in the future, particularly when the Parliament-which 
at present is chosen by and from the national Parliaments-becomes the direct expression of demo-
cratic  opinion  by  being  directly  elected  by  universal  suffrage. 
The Community institutions. then, are subject to democratic control. They are also subject to the rule 
of law. This finds its expression in the Community's Court of Justice-the nearest parallel, perhaps, to 
your own Supreme Court. 
The representatives of the Member Governments sit in the Community's Council of Ministers. This, 
too, is a federal organ - since unlike those of international organizations.  its  decisions  are taken, as 
a rule, by majority vote, thus making it often impossible for one Member State to impose its  veto. 
This is  a  built-in guarantee of progress : it  is  vital to  the  success  of the  whole  enterprise. 
Tasks of the executives 
I  have  left until  last the so-called  'Executives'  of the  Community.  These are fully  independent of 
the Member States in that their Members-some of them ex-Ministers even-are no longer national 
representatives : they are expressly forbidden  to  take instructions, and are responsible exclusively to 
1.  'Customs Union-a  League  of Nations contribution to  the  study  of customs  union  problems',  Lake  Success, 
New  York,  1947,  p.74. 
3 the European Parliament. Their discussions are not public, and once a  decision  has been reached, 
the Executive concerned has collective responsibility for it : decisions are reached, of course, by simple 
majority.  I  said just now  'so-called'  Executives,  because  although  the  analogy  with  the executive 
branch of a classical constitution is a close one, it is  not complete. The most important role of the 
Executives - apart from certain domains where they take and apply decisions directly. affecting the 
Community  as  a  whole-is  threefold.  The  Commission is  first  a  motor, to  stimulate and initiate 
Community action. It has the sole right to propose action in a large number of  fields, and its proposals 
can only be modified by a unanimous vote of the national representatives in the Council.  Secondly, 
the Commission is a watchdog, one of the guardians of the Treaty, keeping Governments and others 
up to the mark. It  must take offenders before the Court of Justice : in at least two cases, it has already 
done so. Thirdly, it plays the part of an honest broker, helping to bring about agreement among the 
Member States, and to ensure thereby that action is taken. Indeed, the basic secret of the Community's 
smooth working is  the constant collaboration-and division of ·labour - between the national repre-
sentatives in the Council and the independent Commission. I need not stress the crucial importance 
of all these roles. 
Nor, I think, do I need to point out that all this panoply of institutions is  itself highly political. It is 
certainly, in the words of the League of Nations report I  quoted earlier, 'some political mechanism'. 
Not only this, but the subject-matter of its actions is itself political. Let me make one final quotation 
from  the League of Nations  text:  'The greater  the interference of the state in  economic life,  the 
greater must be the political  inte.~ation'. For what we are doing, ladies and gentlemen, is  not just 
integrating the action of employers, workers, mere hants, or consumers. What is being integrated is the 
part played by the national states in creating the  conditions within which  economic activity_ takes 
place.  I need not remind you how greatly the role of the state in this field has increased since, say, 
half a century ago, even in the freest and most liberal economies. Indeed, in some respects I think it 
may be true to say that the effect of economic integration  is  to  make  those  economies  more  free, 
and  certainly  more  liberal,  than  under  a  purely  national  economic  regime.  When  one  thinks  of 
agriculture,  for  instance,  it becomes  clear  that integration means  a  degree  of liberation from  in-
numerable  national  protective  measures.  It is  also  clear  that  this  task  is  long, difficult,  and 
delicate - precisely because its subject-matter is so highly political-and, indeed, politically explosive. 
Let me repeat : highly  political. If we  have learned anything in the years of experience which we 
have had since the European Coal and Steel Community first  opened the common market for  coal 
in  1953,  it is  this:  that these  apparently humdrum economic tasks are in reality very much more. 
And that 'very much more', which is  political, is of the very  greatest importance, not only  to the 
Community, but also - and most particularly - to our friends in the rest of the world. 
'We are not in business 
vve are in politics' 
• • • 
This is especially so, I think, in the case of the United States. It is  important because it guarantees 
that we are serious - that we are in earnest. We are not in business to promote tariff preferences, to 
establish a discriminatory club, to form a larger market to make us richer, or a trading bloc to further 
our commercial interests. We are not in business at all : we are in politics. Our aim is  to help our-
selves, and so help others: to rid Europe of the crippling anomalies of the past, and enable her to 
pull her full weight in building tomorrow's world. 
This task is urgent ; and it is a task that does not concern us  alone, or our economies alone  .. It is  a 
political task, and a political task for us all. 
The challenge 
• 
Do I need to remind you, indeed, of how fast our world is  changing ? It is  this single fact, I  think, 
1  that distinguishes  our age from  the  nineteenth  century. 
Only a  few  years ago, children's books were full  of  the  wonders  of  the  new  twentieth  century: 
automobiles, aircraft, telephones,  radio.  We all knew, we all said, that these inventions were going 
to transform our world, reducing distances, bringing peoples closer together. All this has happened. 
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So rapidly have new wonders replaced the old that now, in the age of television, atomic energy, and 
space travel, we  look back with affectionate nostalgia to the age of the early automobile, the biplane 
with  fixed  undercarriage,  the  Bell  telephone,  and the old crystal radio. Yet when we  look at  our 
political life, at our international relations, how far have we really accepted the political consequences 
of even those far-off inventions? And how much less have we applied to our whole way of thinking 
the consequences of more recent advance!  We  are running a race with destiny; we cannot afford to 
run it in  period costume. 
As I have suggested, there are signs of progress. After the first  World War, a great President of the 
United States, Woodrow Wilson, outlined the famous  'Fourteen Points'.  As  a  step forward  at the 
time, this programme was remarkable. It sought to outlaw what were then seen as the causes of war: 
secret treaties, naval jealousies, the arms race, colonial rivalries.  But seen from  a distance of over 
forty years, the Fourteen Points look most remarkable as a symptom of their own age and a consecra-
tion of nationalism. In the words of a recent historian, their aim was to achieve justice ' by making 
states more perfect nation-states'.2 
After World  War II, attitudes had changed.  The old League of Nations was replaced by the United 
Nations - and the change of name was significant. A new network of international organizations came 
into being,  expressing  the general recognition that  even  'perfect'  nation-states  must  acknowledge 
some  degree  of  organized  interdependence.  But  even  this  was  only  a  belated attempt to  face  the 
political consequences of changes that had already occurred in the early years of this century. It  was 
the first conscious effort to draw the logical conclusions from technical inventions now long past. 
The response: integration 
It was not until 1950, in fact, that the process went one stage further, and the concept of the nation-
state itself began to be modified in practice. Hitherto, the attempt to create a new order in the world 
had been limited to intensifying international co-operation between separate states. Now, for the first 
time, it began to take the form of integrating those states together, to reflect in their political life and 
political  organization,  the  radical  changes  brought  about  in  the  first  instance  by  technological 
advance. This, in fact, was  the beginning of the European Community : it is  yet another reason for 
stressing  its  political nature.  For, if co-operation was the political response to the invention of auto-
mobiles, aircraft, telephones, and radio, then economic integration is the political response to those 
even  more  spectacular  innovations  of  the  jet age, of the atomic age,  of which the latest instance 
is space travel by human beings. 
Mention of this fact, I think, recalls that what we face, in this changing world, is more than a purely 
technological challenge. That challenge is  political, too. Indeed, one may well ask whether the efforts 
which the countries of the European Community are making would  have taken shape had there not 
been a direct political stimulus - I may even say a  direct political threat. Certainly, the process  of 
uniting Western Europe has been greatly accelerated by the fact that Europe as a whole is divided by 
the Iron Curtain. Paul-Henri Spaak, in his brilliant little book on NATO, takes as his starting point 
the thirteenth of March, 1948, when the Czech Foreign Minister, Jan Mazaryk, committed suicide-or 
was  murdered : but he rightly points out that this was only the culminating point in a whole series 
of events.  Since the War, indeed, Europe has been menaced by political forces  whose  aim it is  to 
destroy the Western way of life. Those forces are very  close  to  us.  They are very  strong.  They are 
constantly growing  stronger.  Driven  by a  pseudo-religious  sense  of mission,  organized  with  great 
efficiency, and backed by ever-growing resources, they challenge us in all spheres-military, political. 
and economic. Locked in the military balance of power, we  may yet find  ourselves attacked in our 
political  and  economic  life :  all  over  the  world,  indeed,  the  struggle  is  on.  Call  it,  if  you  will, 
'competitive co-existence'; what is clear is that this kind of competition is no mere friendly rivalry, 
but a political and economic challenge that must be met by economic and political means. Faced on 
the  one  hand  by  Communist  empire-building  and on the other by Communist economic planning, 
we  have to prove that our free  system not only is better, but works better. 
2.  David  Thomson:  'Europe Since  Napoleon', London,  1957,  p.534. 
5 Never purely economic 
In this context; can we regard the integration of Europe as  a  purely  economic  phenomenon ?  Is  it. 
indeed, has it ever been, a purely economic affair ? 
As  a matter of recent experience, the answer is  'no'.  There  was  the  plan-unhappily  it came  to  • 
nothing - for a European army, the European Defence  Community.  What  more  strikingly  political 
proposal could be imagined? With it went the proposal for a European Political· Community  .. Both 
failed - not so much because of a general lack of the will  to achieve them, as  because of particular 
political  circumstances,  among  others  a virulent  and  largely  Communist  inspired  propaganda 
campaign  against .  them. 
But  this failure  was. not the signal for retreat.  Less than a year later came the Messina Conference 
and the proposals for the Common Market and Euratom. And their goal is not only, as  I have said, 
the economic integration of Europe, with all the political overtones that this implies. It is also to carry 
one stage further an essentially political movement. It is no accident, for example, that the Euratom 
Treaty should .contain  ~he geFil1  of. a  'European  University'. It is  no  paradox that the Community 
countries  should now be  feeling their way  towards  a· unity  of  political  action.  partly  under  the 
stimulus of the  suggestions  made last year by  President de  Gaulle. 
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From co-operatlon.to integration 
All this, moreover, falls in line with the natural evolution of Europe itself.  In that sense, in  seeking 
political unity, we have history on our side. Even a generation ago, we used to speak of 'the concert 
of the Powers'.  Traditionally, the structure of Europe consisted of a  multiplicity of separate states 
with  their own  separate structures, which· although they  did  not always  act in  total  isolation from 
each other, came together only in temporary and ad hoc groupings. Basically, the system rested upon 
the  balance  of  power  between  France  and  Germany,  with - often - Great  Britain  in  the  role  of 
moderator between them. It  was a contrapuntal concert of Europe with conductors - sometimes -from 
outside the European continent.  • 
That concert is silenced. It reached its finale in  19 39-a bitter and tragic finale that continued for six 
years. Then, if not before, it became obvious that the nineteenth century system so masterfully employed 
by Bismarck could no longer endure in the twentieth century. It  gave place to the system of Schuman, 
of Adenauer, of Sforza, of De Gasperi, of Spaak, and a whole new generation of statesmen. In place 
of the balance, of power, they  created the fusion  of  interests.  In  place  of  the  ad  hoc groupings  of 
separate states, they  proposed the pooling of problems and resources.  In place of co-operation, they 
worked for integration. In place of the concert of the  Powers,  they  set as  their  goal  an  ever  closer 
union, shaped by common institutions, and built upon deeds, not words. 
Need for a  political choice 
These things did not happen automatically: in politics. nothing does. They demanded a clear choice, 
and a  political choice.  Need  I add that this fundamental  political  decision  has  already  borne  un-
mistakably  political  fruit?  In  1946,  just  a  year after  the  War,  Winston  Churchill  called  for  a 
reconciliation. of  France and  Germany  'within  a  kind  of  United  States  of  Europe'.  Ladies  and 
gentlemen, those words were prophetic. There has been a transformation of Germany's relations with 
France. Fifty years ago, my teacher in Mainz on the Rhine used to tell us that France was Germany's 
'natural  enemy',  ordained  by  providence  as  such for all time; A few  miles away, no  doubt, little 
French boys were being taught the same pernicious nonsense-from the opposite point of view. Today, 
it would be laughable - if its past consequences  had not been so  tragic. 
Those consequences themselves are a further political factor in the story. You in the United States 
are commemorating this year the hundredth anniversary of the Civil War. The War of 1939 to 1945,  • 
was,  I sincerely hope, the last civil war in Western Europe. From your Civil War you emerged as a 
nation: from ours we  emerged as  a nascent Community. Nor is  it by chance that the geographical 
area of the Six founder States of the European Community  is  almost identical  with  that which  was 
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brought to the brink of destruction, both materially, and psychologically, by  the Nazi-Fascist monster 
and by  the  second  World  War.  The former  debased the concept of national sovereignty: the latter 
emptied it of substance. Frontiers seem less real when  they  can  be  flattened  by  tanks or ignored by 
intercontinental  missiles. 
Immense political changes 
But  these  brutal political facts - facts  that we  have had to face  most  clearly in  Europe itself - ate 
themselves only part of the immense political changes which have been transforming the whole world 
during this century. I said just now that in the economic sphere the world  map is  no longer made 
up  of countries: it is  made up of continents. This is true also in the political sphere. We are familiar 
with the idea of two  great world powers-the United States and the Soviet Union. We are becoming 
familiar with the emergence of Communist China, with the rapid changes on the continent of Africa, 
with  new  prospects and new dangersin Latin America. Here, too, is a  politicalchallenge, but of a 
different kind. It is a challenge of scale, a challenge of size  .. In a world of giants, we cannot afford to 
be midgets. Here, then, is a further political motive for seeking real unity-political unity-in Europe. 
Tovvards an ·Atlantic community 
This does not mean, of course, that. we are seeking to create some kind of 'third force'  in Europe. 
some kind of divisive factor within the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, the same political challenge that is 
leading us to unite in Europe makes it all the more necessary for us  to cement our European Com-
munity within the larger and perforce looser community that is  the Atlantic Community. If we  are 
seeking  to create what has been called 'a second  America in  the  West', it is  because we  wish  to 
become  a  strong  and valid  partner for  the 'first'  America - to  be  one  of  the  pillars  upon  which 
the  Alliance itself is  built.  Not only do we  believe  in  'interdependence' :  we  owe  to it whatever 
progress  we  have achieved  since  the War.  We  shall never forget the foresight, the imagination, and 
the  sheer  generosity  with  which  the  United  States helped  to  restore Europe after World  War II. 
Today, that phase is over. Europe is on her feet again, and charity can be replaced by co-operation. 
And we need to co-operate - to defend ourselves, to help others, to fight poverty, to make a real attack 
on  all those  problems which  not even  the European Community as a  whole,  not even  the  United 
States as a whole, can tackle effectively alone. Can  a  so-called  'third  force'  maintain  the  NATO 
shield by itself? Can it meet by itself the needs of the developing countries? Can it alone solve the 
problems of booms and slumps, of currency reserves, of agricultural surpluses ? Of course not. Ladies 
and gentlemen, we must rally the forces of the Atlantic Community to tackle these problems together, 
and to create a new economic order in the free world.  What better way  to begin than by uniting the 
European partners in this great venture? Already, indeed, the creation of the European Community 
is  beginning to exert a cohesive effect.  Without it, would Great Britain now be rethinking her wh~le 
relationship to continental Europe? Without it, should we have seen those other steps forward that have 
culminated in the formation of the O.E.C.D.? The stone once cast into the pool, the rings broaden out 
into ever widening circles. 
I do not wish to claim too much for the European Community. But I do believe, and tonight I hope 
to  have  shown  you  why I  believe-that the movement for European integration, far from being a 
mere  movement for technocrats, for economists,  is one that is essentially political, and therefore one 
that concerns all of us. It is a movement that is still in progress.  Not all the problems are solved  as 
yet - nor are all the dangers overcome, but we  are determined, and we  are hopeful. 
Moreover,  if  there  is  one  conclusion that emerges inescapably from  what I  have been  saying  here 
tonight it is that the political integration of Europe can only make its full contribution to the strength 
and safety of us  all if it goes  hand in hand with ever closer links across the Atlantic. It now  takes 
less  time to cross the Atlantic than it once took to cross the Mediterranean ; and as the ocean that 
both divides and joins us,  the Atlantic is  indeed the Mediterranean of our own day. 
7 A  nevv and creative approach 
I do not need to remind you of the many problems that we share, the many tasks that we must face 
together.  Let me mention only three of them.  There is  the problem of our international monetary 
system,  and the repercussions  that even  minor changes may have on the safety of all our currencies. 
the fruits of our thrift and industry, and even the stability of our political life. There is the problem of 
agricultural production in the age of modern technology - the problem of surpluses, and the problem 
of adaptation on the land. And finally, there is the  pressing need to work together to help the world's 
developing countries-what Dean Rusk has rightly called 'a matter of life  and death for freedom'. 
These are some of the problems that the new Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment  will  be  tackling  in  the  years  to  come - with  the  full  participation  of  both  the  European 
Community and the United States, as well as of our other friends and partners in the free world. How 
important that partnership is  I do not need to stress. 
We  for  our  part  believe  that  the  even  closer  partnership  we  are  establishing  in  the  European 
Community is one of the very few new political inventions that we in the West have made since World 
War II. We  are determined to use it, in collaboration with the United States and with the West as a 
whole, to make a new  and creative approach to the  many  other  political  and  economic  problems 
that face us  all throughout the globe. With the help of our friends, with your help, we shall succeed . 
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